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DRAFT
Often an auction designer has the option of selling, or purchasing, those lots
available in one auction or a sequence of auctions. In addition, bidder opportu-
nities will not be static, in part due to arrival of information, but also because
bidders can face deadlines for making decisions. This paper examines the optimal
decision about how to divide what is available over time.
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1 Introduction
Auctions for similar or identical items often occur at different times. This poses a decision
problem for bidders - how should a bidder adjust its bid in an early auction because of op-
portunities in subsequent auctions. A bidder’s decision problem can be further complicated
by the fact that circumstances can change due to new information, changes in circumstances
facing the bidders, and due to bidder actions, between auctions. At the same time, the
auction manager or originator also has a decision problem of how to allocate the amount to
be auctioned over time. Clearly, these are not independent problems. While in any given
auction, the auction manager can withdraw some, or all, of what it wants to buy or sell,
out of the auction, the bidders might respond strategically, and bid less aggressively. Thus,
for the auction manager to reduce auction volume in response to limited competition in
one auction may only postpone the inevitable. This paper shows that this logic is incom-
plete. Indeed, somewhat surprisingly, the auction manager can do better, sometimes much
better, by splitting the auction volume over two or more dates even when bidders respond
strategically.
There are a number of different effects that can explain these results. The primary reason
that is identified here is that bidders’ rank can change across auctions. More specifically,
when the best losing bid in one auction is not guaranteed to be a winner in the next auction,
then the opportunity cost for a bidder is not expected price in the second auction, but the
bidder’s expected surplus. When bidders’ values do not change from one auction to the
next, then Weber’s Martingale theorem applies - the expected price in one auction in a
sequence of auctions is the realized price in the previous auction. In this paper, bidders’
values do change from one auction to the next. A bidder would otherwise win in one auction,
but strategically withholds, is not guaranteed a win in the next auction. Thus, a bidder’s
reservation price in one auction is no longer the expected price for the next auction. This
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limits the benefits to a bidder of strategic withholding.
Other factors can also limit benefits of strategic withholding. For example, when delay
in completing a transaction is costly for one, or both, sides, then auction manager’s option to
delay can fully or partially offset a bidder’s strategic withholding. This also has implications
for the definition of market power. These results suggest that the ability of firms to obtain
super-normal returns will depend not only on market structure, but market organization,
and the ability of market designers to counter firms’ potential efforts to exert market power.
These issues arise in sequential auctions in many different sectors. Auctions are often
conducted for future, and not immediate, delivery. This analysis was largely motivated
by actual experience in the energy sector.1 Electric utilities, to ensure reliability, must
purchase energy generation services prior to realization of demand. Utilities in a number
of jurisdictions do so in forward auctions, that can be as much as five years in advance
of performance, and as little as six minutes in advance. The decision about how much
is purchased in advance can, as explained below, have a large impact on the outcome.
Moreover, suppliers bidding into such auctions often have other options, such as selling
in adjacent areas, that can alter competition across auctions held at different dates in a
manner similar to that modeled in this paper. However, this analysis does not apply only
to energy procurement. Another example is the auctions of dairy products.2 One large
dairy producer, Fonterra, conducts bi-monthly auctions, generally for delivery one-to-three
months in advance. Fonterra has a fairly inelastic aggregate supply of its products available,
and limited ability to defer sales. This analysis is useful to determine how an entity such as
an electric utility or a Fonterra should manage its auction volume across possible auction
dates.
This analysis also suggests that competition policy guidelines should be based not just
1See Loxley and Salant (2004) for detailed discussion of one example.
2See http://www.globaldairytrade.info/
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on market structure, but on market rules - when the market originator can choose to divide
auction volume across time, then these decisions, will affect prices and returns. Moreover,
when the auction manager in one auction can strategically shift volume over time, then
bidder returns are further reduced. In short, auction design and rules can affect relative
bargaining power on the two sides of an auction. This can have implications for enforcement
as well in cases such as the California energy markets in which prices may have spiked to
super-competitive levels in part because of the market rules.
The analysis here applies when bidders have a fixed amount they want to bid for. Bidders
in forward auctions may have limited financing, or limited needs. In reverse auctions, bidders
will often have limited capacities. These auctions can be for forward delivery, in which the
earlier auctions are further in advance of the delivery date than the later auctions. The
following analysis applies to at least three factors that can affect the strategic spacing of a
given target volume across a number of auctions over time. First, opportunities may change.
Actions that might have been feasible at one date, can become infeasible at a later date an
vice versa.
Second, bidders can take actions between auctions that can foreclose or open up some
options. When firms face scheduling and other time constraints, they will tend to take
actions that will affect future options. Firms cannot always delay decisions, or may only be
able do so at a cost. Third, information can become more precise over time, reducing bidder
uncertainty.
These type of issues arise in many auctions and other types of markets. One specific
application of the analysis in this paper is to energy procurement. Many energy resources
are purchased in advance of need, and over time. Examples include transmission rights,
capacity credits, and default service supply.3 An energy trader or a load serving entity
3BGS, Illinois, RTOs.
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may need to assemble combinations of different resources to meet specific obligations, such
as serving the electricity demands of a particular set of customers for a specific period of
time. These arrangements must be in place usually long before performance, or delivery, is
required. Physical resources generally provide different sets of overlapping type of services,
such as energy and capacity. Therefore, these type of energy traders can find themselves
long or short in specific types of resources as they approach the delivery date.
This paper builds off at least three separate strands of literature. A number of papers
have studied both the theory4 and experience5 Weber showed that in sequence of auctions
of identical objects, in which bidders have independent private values and are risk neutral,
and in which bidder valuations do not change across auctions, the expected price in each
auction is the realized price of the previous auction. That is, on average, there should be
no upwards or downwards trend in prices, or, in more technical terms, the expected price is
a martingale.. The intuition is that the marginal bidder in each auction will bid based on
what it expects price to be in the next auction.
The empirical results has largely found different price patterns. Ashenfelter observed
in sequences of wine auctions, and later in other types of auctions, such as for art, real
estate, and cattle, prices tend to decline more often than not. The empirical research that
identified the declining price anomaly and afternoon effects have given rise to another strand
of research which develops conditions under which prices will decrease, or increase, across a
sequence of auctions.
McAfee and Vincent (1993) find that prices will decrease if bidders are risk averse:
early bids are equal to expected later prices plus a risk premium. Their explanation relies
4See Weber (1983) and Milgrom and Weber (1982).
5Ashenfelter (1989) examined sequential auctions of identical cases of wine and port. Subsequently
Ashenfelter and Graddy (2002) studied art auctions, Ashenfelter and Genesove (1992) looked at real
estate and Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1992) looked at cattle auctions.
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on the assumption of non-decreasing absolute risk aversion. Bernhardt and Scoones look at
two sequential auctions with stochastically equivalent values. They find that even though
bidders are risk-neutral, prices fall. Intuitively, bidders with higher valuations in the first
auction discount their bids (due to the option value of participating in later auctions) less
than those with lower valuations, and it is this first group that determines the price in the
first auction, leading prices to fall in subsequent auctions.6 This paper extends this analysis
in a number of ways. I find with a variable number of auctions, bidders and objects per
auction, prices can rise or fall. Common to all these models is that one item is auctioned
at a time.
Another line of research has recognized that bidder ability to benefit from strategic
withholding in multi-unit auctions can be attenuated when the auction manager can adjust
the auction volume.7 . For example, in a uniform-price auction, bidders compete by si-
multaneously submitting their demand schedules for the divisible good on offer. The seller
compares aggregate demand with the auction supply and computes the clearing price, which
is then paid by all bidders. Uniform-price auctions of a divisible good in fixed supply may
lead to bidders strategically submitting high inframarginal bids, resulting in a lower clearing
price. When a bidder can be pivotal, the auction manager or auction designer can offset the
strategic withholding incentives of such a bidder by making the auction supply or demand
variable. The basic idea is that a bidder’s market power is reduced when the supply or
demand schedule it faces is more elastic. This assumes that any quantities not purchased or
sold in the given auction will never be re-auctioned. This paper relaxes this assumption.8
6See also Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1993) and Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1994)
7See McAdams (2006), Back and Zender (2001), LiCalzi and Pavan (2005),
Lengwiler (1999) and Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1998).
8A more recent paper by Horner and Samuelson (2010) look at pricing over time. Here, the amount for sale
or purchase at any point in time is a variable, and the auctions occur at fixed discrete dates rather than
continuously over time.
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Section 2 explains why bidder valuations can change from one auction to the next. This
paper’s focus is on changes that result from changes in values or opportunity costs over time,
but also allows bidders to learn between auctions, or as a result of information revealed during
the early auctions. The following section presents a set of simple two period procurement
auction example. This section calculates equilibrium prices and outcomes when the auction
manager purchases all units at one time, and compares those ex ante costs with two other
cases: (1) the auction manager determines ex ante how it will split the procurement across
the two periods and (2) the auction manager sets reservation price for one or two each in the
first auction. This following section derives equilibrium bidding rules for N bidders and K
identical units being purchased at at most two separate auction dates. When decisions must
be made in advance about the allocation of the K units over the two periods, it is shown
that the optimal decision is to divide the K units across the two auctions. However, the
auction manager can lower expected procurement costs by setting unit specific reservation
prices. These results are derived assuming costs at the two auction dates are independently
drawn from stochastically equivalent distributions. Section 5 considers arbitrary number
of discrete auction dates, and provides an example of a three period auction with a finite
number of units. Section 6 concludes with some discussion of other factors that can result
in increasing or decreasing prices.
2 How Bidder Values Change Over Time
This section describes ways in which bidder values can change over time. This section is
intended to motivate the examples and the assumptions of the more general analysis that
follows. I also assume throughout this paper that the auction manager does NOT have the
discretion to withhold volume; so demand is totally inelastic if it this is a reverse auction,
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and supply is totally inelastic for forward auctions.9 The only discretion given to the auction
manager is to delay transactions until the next auction. And in the final auction, the auction
manager does not have any further discretion to delay its purchases. Most of the analysis
assumes that the auctions are for future delivery, and not current consumption or use.
Even where the auction is for current consumption, a seller may be able to delay delivery,
for example when it has storage facilities, and a buyer may be able to defer consumption. 10
One of the motivations for this analysis is experience in energy procurement auctions.
In those auctions, a utility will be purchasing energy services, capacity and related products
in advance of the required performance. Often the energy product is purchased months in
advance, and the contract duration can span years.11 The auction manager faces decisions
about how much to purchase in advance, and when.
Between auction dates, bidder costs can change due to a variety of factors. First, if
the auctions are for future delivery, and the later auctions are closer to the delivery date,
then bidders may learn more about likely values or costs. This can reduce uncertainy; it
can also cause the distribution of values to become more or less disperse. For instance,
in energy procurement, some project developers anticipating site approval or environmental
approvals, can encounter unforeseen obstacles. At the same time, other bidders might find
that approvals are easier to obtain than first anticipated. Whatever the reason that costs
or values can change over time, a bidder’s optimal decision in one auction should include the
expected surplus that can be derived from participating in the next auction, and not just
9See McAdams (2006) for a discussion of strategic adjustment of the auction manager’s demand or supply
schedule.
10The Fonterra dairy auctions mentioned above include auctions every two weeks for the sale of whole milk
powder, skim milk powder and milk solids. Most of the products can be stored, as least for a limited
amount of time. Fonterra has some storage capacity, and can defer delivery at one date if demand is low.
See for example
http://www.fonterra.com/wps/wcm/connect/fonterracom/fonterra.com/our+business/news/media+
releases/market+pricing+signs+positive+in+globaldairytrade+event.
11See Loxley and Salant (2004) for a description of one such auction.
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the expected value conditional on having the most optimistic signal in the first.
More specifically, consider a reverese auction in which a bidder has a signal of its
performance costs, and let e denote its expected cost conditional on its signal and its having
a winning bid in the first auction. Then that bidder should not want to accept a price as low
as e if its expected surplus from withholding its supply in the first auction and participating
in the second is positive. If bidders’ expected costs do not change, or if all shocks are
common to all bidders, then the low cost bidder’s expected surplus in the first auction can
be derived from the expected surplus that the winning bidder expects to derive in the last,
or nth, auction, and the prices will be a Martingale. However, if the marginal bidder in
the (k − 1)st is no longer always the winning bidder kth auction in equilibrium, then the
equilibrium auction prices need no longer be a Martingale.
Second, bidders can engage in other transactions. A bidder with power to sell at one
date, can enter into a contract between auction dates. This will take the bidder out of the
second auction, or increase its opportunity costs. Conversely a bidder might find additional
resources, or long term contracts might expire, allowing a bidder that had little ability to
compete in one auction to participate more aggressively at a later date. Similarly, bidders
might encounter unanticipated changes, both for good and bad, in their financial position
across auction dates.
Third, bidders may base offers not only on their own resources, but also on complemen-
tary offers from third parties.12 Or bidders in an auction may have buyers, who are not
directly participating, lined up to purchase all or part of what is won in the auction. The
third party contracts available prior to one auction may not always be available when the
next auction takes place. Indeed there could be other auctions. However, the fact that
12In energy procurement auction, especially where the winners have to provide an array of services, an
individual bidder’s offer may be contingent on an array of third party offers for some component parts of
what is being bid in the auction. See Loxley and Salant (2004) for a discussion.
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there may be competing auctions does not necessarily mean that prices should differ across
the auctions.13 This paper focuses on the case in which bidders view the products being
auctioned at different dates as substitutes, and mostly perfect substitutes. When there are
sequential auctions of complements, prices are likely to fall across auctions, as is explained
below.14
Throughout what follows, I assume a finite sequence of procurement auctions. Further,
I assume that if the bids are for future delivery, then winning bidders in each auction
can achieve costs equal to their cost estimates at the time of the auction (or at the time
the auction closes). This imposes no loss of generality as long as bidder expectations are
unbiased conditional on the outcome of each auction.
3 Simple Two Auction Examples
This section presents examples in which an auction manager must procure a fixed number,
K, lots of an identical product in a sequence of two auctions in which there are N bidders
competing.15 Most of what follows assumes each bidder can only supply at most one unit.
Therefore, a winning bidder in the first auction will not be able to participate in the second
auction. The basic question addressed in the examples of this section whether the auction
manager might want to divide the lots available into two (or more) auctions, and if so, how.
13Suppose, for example, there are two auctions, N bidders, each bidder can win at most one lot, and the
bidder j′s costs in both auctions is a random draw from the uniform distribution on [0, 1]. Then, assuming
each auction is run as a 2nd price sealed bid, or English auction, the expected price in both auctions will
be 3
N+1
.
14See, for example Woo et. al. (2004).
15This analysis also applies to forward auctions, for selling two objects; the notation is a bit simpler for
procurement auctions. This example is a generalization of the two-unit, two-auction example of Bernhardt
and Scoones (1994).
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3.1 Two Lots - In One Auction or Two?
The simplest situation is one in which there are only two lots available. The question then
arises as to whether the auction manager should purchase the two lots in one auction or in
two.
The auction manager can either purchase both units at the same date or at two different
dates. For each possible auction date, each bidder j has costs (or a signal of what it expects
costs will be when it must provide delivery or performance) cj , cj ∈ [0, 1], j = 1, 2, ..., N. It is
assumed that the values are independent draws from an identical distribution for all bidders
and all dates. However, it is not assumed that a bidder’s cost at the first auction date are
the same as at the second. This means that the lowest cost losing bidder in the first auction
will not necessarily be the low cost bidder in the second auction. So, a bidder’s decision
about what price to offer in the first auction involves both its prediction for the second
auction price as well as that bidder’s probability of winning in the second auction. It is
assumed that bidders only can supply one unit in total, so that a winner in the first auction
does not participate in the second auction. Below, I explain how relaxing this assumption
affects the results. However, this assumption limits the possibility of bidder strategically
withholding supply in order to obtain a better price.
When K = 2, bidder valuations are uniform in each auction, and there are two auctions,
following Bernhardt and Scoones, it can be shown that the expected price in the second
auction, assuming either a first price or second price sealed bid, is 2/N. This will provide
the winner in the second auction with an expected surplus of 1/N .16 This means that the
expected price in the first auction will be 2N+1 +
1
N(N−1) . As Bernhardt and Scoones have
16If costs were distributed according to the distribution F(c), then the winner in the second auction would
receive a price of F−1(2/N) amd would receive an expected surplus of F−1(2/N) − F−1(1/N). This
follows as the distribution function associated with any random variable is uniform on [0, 1]. Most of
what follows will generalize to arbitrary distributions of costs.
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shown, the expected price in the first auction is higher than in the second auction whenever
N > 3. One question not addressed previously is whether expected procurement costs
would be larger or smaller if there were one auction or two. It is straightforward to show
that the expected price if both units were purchased in one auction would be 3N+1 . The
expected costs in one auction are higher purchasing both units in one auction as compared
to purchasing one unit in each of two auctions whenever N ≥ 3. This also maximizes social
welfare. In general, the allocation that minimizes expected procurement costs need not
maximize welfare, as the auction manager may want to defer purchases to ensure a lower
expected price in the last auction than would minimize total costs of the suppliers. This is
discussed in more detail in section 3 below.
This assumption about how costs, or forecasts of costs, evolve over time is very specific.
The principles illustrated with the implicit information development assumptions generalize
in ways explained in the next section; the particular example is intended to simplify the
calculations of expected values.
This example can be generalized in a number of ways. First, I consider the situation
where the number of lots in the auction can exceed two. I describe the optimal ex ante
(open loop) rule for dividing the lots across auctions. Then, I examine what the optimal
reservation price is for each unit. I also derive a rule for the auction manager to use to
determine how many units to allocate in the first auction, and what to leave for the next
assuming that the auction manager can use closed loop decision rules. Bidders are assumed
to be strategic and withhold supply in the first auction.
3.2 How to Divide Auction Quantity Among Two Auctions?
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This example generalizes the above by considering the case where K > 2. Now, the auction
manager has to determine what fraction of the auction volume to purchase in each auction.
I assume that it is common knowledge that the auction manager must purchase the entire
K units in the two auctions. I first consider the case in which the auction manager must
decide the number of lots to purchase in each auction in advance of the first auction. I
then consider the case in which the auction manager can defer purchases in the first auction
based on the offers. The first example is an open loop optimization and the second a closed
loop one.
3.2.1 Ex Ante Optimal Division of the Auction Quantity
Assuming X units are purchased in the first auction, and Y = K −X are purchased in the
second auction, then the second auction price will be p2 =
Y+1
N−X+1 =
K−X+1
N−X+1 . This implies
that the average second period winner will have costs of Y+12(N−X+1) , and will therefore have
an average surplus (for winners) of Y+12(N−X+1) . This implies a first period price of
X+1
N+1 +
Y
(N−X)
Y+1
2(N−X+1) =
X+1
N+1 +
(K−X)
(N−X)
K−X+1
2(N−X+1) - the probability that a first auction loser will be a
second auction winner is (K−X)(N−X) . Total costs are then X
(
X+1
N+1 +
K−X+1
2(N−X+1)
(K−X)
(N−X)
)
+ (K −
X)
(
K−X+1
N−X+1
)
. Notice that the first auction expected price is higher, the larger the quantity
purchased in the first period and similarly, second auction price is larger the larger is the
quantity purchased in the second auction. The optimal ex ante value of X ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,K}
will minimize
C(X,K) = X
(
X + 1
N + 1
+
K −X + 1
2(N −X)(N −X + 1)
)
+ (K −X)
(
K −X + 1
N −X + 1
)
(1)
and, if there is no second auction, then the second term in the right hand side of (??) is
zero. So, C(0,K) = C(K,K) = K
(
K+1
N+1
)
. It will be optimal, ex ante, to divide the auction
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quantity between the two dates. The following tables provide some illustrative calculations.
The first example assumes N = 10 and K = 4
x y p1 p2 Total Costs
0 4 - .46 1.82
1 3 .25 .4 1.45
2 2 .31 .33 1.29
3 1 .38 .25 1.39
4 0 .46 - 1.82
The second example considers the case in which N = 400, K = 250
x y p1 p2 Total Costs
0 250 0.198 0.63 156.48
100 150 0.377 0.501 112.98
140 110 0.442 0.425 108.60
141 109 0.443 0.423 108.598202
142 108 0.445 0.421 108.598178
143 107 0.446 0.419 108.60
145 105 0.449 0.414 108.63
150 100 0.457 0.402 109.79
What these examples illustrate is that there is a benefit in splitting the auction quantity
over the two auctions, and some advantage of auctioning more in the first auction than in
the second, at least when there is a large quantity to be purchased in aggregate. The reason
to divide the auction quantity is that the auction manager gets a larger sample of offers.
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A bidder at one date is effectively a different bidder at a different date, in that its costs
can be higher or lower. Dividing the volume lowers the expected procurement costs, absent
strategic bidding. However, bidders will behave strategically. Bidders in one auction will
want a higher profit margin than in a later auction. This strategic withholding effect limits
how much the auction manager will want to delay procurement.
3.2.2 Ex Post Division - Optimal Reserve Prices
Here, I supposed that the auction manager can decide, based on the bids, how much to
purchase in the first auction. This is not always practical, as to implement such policies
will require pauses in the auction while decisions are made, or for formulas to be worked out
in advance. At times, it will be possible to work out decision rules in advance.
To see the benefits, I revisit the two unit-two-auction example from above. It is
assumed that bidders in the first auction will act strategically, so that a low-cost bidder will
decide to withhold supply when that bidder thinks it can expect a better return in the second
auction. The fact that in the last auction it is possible to calculate expected costs of one
or two units, allows both the auction manager and strategic bidders to explicitly calculate
reservation prices. Thus, in the first auction, the auction manager should
14
1. Never purchase at all when there are no bids below the expected per unit cost of
deferring the purchase of both units to a second auction.
2. Purchase only one lot in the first auction, if the purchase price of the first lot is below
the expected cost of a second lot in the second auction, and the price of the second lot
in the first auction is above its expected cost in the second auction.
3. Purchase both lots in the first auction when the price of the second lot in the first
auction is below the expected price of a first lot in the second auction.
These three principles pin down an effective demand curve for the auction manager in
the first auction. Going back to the above example in which the auction manager must
purchase two lots, and bidders have uniform distributions of costs in each auction, it is
straightforward to work out the reservation prices. The reservation price for the second lot
in the first auction should be 2n . The second lowest cost of the n remaining bidders will
determine the expected price when only one lot is purchased in the second auction. And the
reservation price for the first lot in the first auction is 3n+1 . In his case, the third lowest cost
will determine the expected price when two lots are purchased in the second auction.
As an illustration of the expected savings of the closed loop solution as compared to the
open loop one, suppose there are 4 bidders.
First consider the case where the two auctions are conducted with separate reserve prices
for each unit in the first auction. In this case, the reserve price for the first unit is 0.6 and
0.5 for the second unit. All four bidders will have costs greater than 0.6 with probability
0.44, in which case both units will be purchased in the second period. One unit will be
purchased in the first auction when at least one bidder has costs below 0.6 and no more than
one bidder has costs below 0.5. This occurs with probability 0.2969. Finally, two units will
be purchased in the first auction when two or more bidders have costs no more than 0.5.
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This has a probability of 0.6875.
In comparison, when the auction manager decides in advance to purchase one unit in
each auction, it would purchase one unit in the first action or pay a higher price in the first
auction 50% of the time as compared to the closed loop case. The open loop expected costs
are 0.9066 whereas the closed loop expected costs are 0.8566.
3.3 Bidder Strategic Withholding
The above examples assume that each seller has only one unit to sell. When a bidder has a
significant share of the auction volume, and can withhold a fraction of it in the first auction,
a bidder will have an additional incentive to withhold supply. The simplest example is the
case in which the auction manager wants to purchase (or sell) two lots, and one bidder has
the capacity to win both. To illustrate the effects of having a ”large” bidder, I assume that
there are three bidders in total, two of which are small, having the capacity to bid for only
one lot each, and the other is large, and can win both. I let c1 ≤ ˜c1 denote the costs of the
two lots that the large bidder can provide, and cf ≤ c˜f denote the costs of the two small
bidders (the subscript f denotes the ”field”). As above, each of the c′js are drawn from a
uniform distribution on [0, 1] in each auction. In what follows, I let (c1, c2, c3, c4) denote
the four draws of costs ordered from lowest to highest.
There are essentially six possible orderings:
1. The large bidder has the two lowest cost units. [(c1, c˜1, cf , c˜f )]
2. The large bidder has the first and third lowest cost units.[(c1, cf , c˜1, c˜f )]
3. The large bidder has the first and fourth lowest cost units.[(c1, cf , c˜f , c˜1)]
4. The large bidder has the second and third lowest cost units. [(cf , c1, c˜1, c˜f )]
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5. The large bidder has the second and fourth lowest cost units.[(cf , c1, c˜f , c˜1)], and
6. The large bidder has the two highest cost units.[(cf , c˜f , c1, c˜1)]
If there is a single auction, then the large, two-lot, bidder can have an incentive to bid
too high, or withhold supply, in cases 1, 2 and 4. It can affect price in all the cases, but
would not have an incentive to do so in those other cases - assuming all units are sold at the
third lowest price.
In case 1, the large bidder who bids its second lot high, will earn an expected profit of
4
5 − c1 instead of 35 − c1 + 35 −
˜
c1. On average, the large bidder will be indifferent between
over-bidding as compared to sincere bidding, but depending on its realized costs, may choose
to over bid its second lot.
In cases 2 and 4, the large bidder’s losing bid sets the price, and so it can benefit from
over-bidding.
In cases 3 and 5, a bidder from the field sets the price, and so the large bidder has no
incentive to overbid.
In case 6, the large bidder does not win, and has no incentive to overbid. On net, the
expected per unit cost will be 35 with probability
2
3 , and
4
5 with probability
1
3 ,or a total cost
of 43 .
Next, consider the case in which there are two auctions, and that one unit is purchased
in each auction. Also, assume, as above that each auction is a second-price sealed-bid
auction. Again, there are six logically relevant cases in the first period, as described above.
The large bidder is the logical winner in cases 1, 2 and 3. In case 1, it clearly can benefit
from over-bidding its second lot, and there is no cost in doing so. The question is what is
the benefit to the large bidder of overbidding its first lot.
If the large bidder does NOT over bid on the first lot, it has a 13 probability of winning
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the second auction, and earning an expected surplus of 14 for a total expected surplus,
conditional on winning the first auction of 112 . If the large bidder loses the first auction,
by over-bidding, it then has a 23 probability of winning the second auction, and earning an
expected surplus of 14 with probability
1
6 or
1
2 with probability
1
12 . Its expected surplus is
then again 112 . Thus, the large bidder has no expected gain from over-bidding in the first
auction, on average, but may want to do so if its low cost lot in the first auction is not very
low, that is if c1is large. On the other hand, if c1 is small, then it will not want to overbid
in the first auction. Even if the large bidder over bids its first lot in cases 2 and 3, the
expected cost in the first auction will be not more than 23 × 25 + 13 × 35 = 715 .
If the large bidder is a first auction loser, then it will win with probability 23 and set
the price too with probability 13 . In this case the expected price in the second auction
will be 34 . Otherwise, with probability
2
3 , the expected cost in the first auction will be .5.
Expected costs in the second auction cannot exceed 712 . Total costs in the two auctions
cannot exceed 715 +
7
12 = 1.05, which is less than the expected costs when both units are
purchased in a single auction. Thus, as this example illustrates, the auction manager will
have incentives to split the procurement across dates even where large strategic bidders can
also act strategically to shift their supply too. The auction manager can further benefit
from setting unit and bidder specific reserve prices.
4 Two Auction Cases
This section considers a more general set of two auction cases. I assume that the auction
manager wants to purchase K lots, and can do so at two different, specific dates.
Again there are N bidders, and each bidder j has costs cjt in auction t = 1, 2. Here, I
assume that, for t = 1, these costs are distributed over the unit interval, [0, 1], but no longer
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assume that the costs are independently drawn at each date. I first consider the case in
which costs in period 2 are cj2 = cj1 + z, where z is some random shock, which is the same
for all bidders. In this case, the Martingale Theorem still applies.
Proposition 1 Suppose there are N suppliers, who each can sell at most one unit. Let cjt
denote j′s cost in period t = 1, 2. Suppose that the cj1’s are uniformly distributed over [0, 1],
and cj2 = cj1 + z for each j. Suppose the auctioneer will purchases X units in the first
auction, and Y = K −X units in the second auction, where N > K. Suppose too that the
price in each auction is the highest losing offer. Also suppose that E[cK+1|c] is an increasing
function of c, where E[cK+1|c] is the expected value, as of period 1, of the (K + 1)st lowest
cost in period 2 for a bidder with cost c. Then the first period price is E[cK+1|cK ] and the
second period price is cK+1 + z, where and cK+1 + z is the (K + 1)st lowest cost in period
2.
Proof: The proof follows Milgrom (2004). Consider the second period auction. The
expected value of the price will be cK+1+z as the Y = K−X lowest cost suppliers remaining
in the the second auction will win, and this is the expected value of amount that the lowest
cost loser will bid, assuming that the X lowest cost suppliers win in the first auction. If
one of these X bidders does not win in the firms auction, but another of the K lowest cost
bidders win in the first auction, the expected value of the price in the second auction will still
be cK+1+z. And, it cannot be an equilibrium for one of the K lowest cost bidders to submit
losing bids in both auctions. Now, no bidder in the first auction should accept a price lower
than the expected value of the price in the second auction. This means that bidders whose
costs are lower than E[cK+1|c] will want to offer this amount in the first auction, and bidders
with higher costs will bid their true costs. The assumption that E[cK+1|c] is an increasing
function of c, means that the X lowest cost bidders will win the first auction. In the second
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auction, the next K − X low cost bidders will win, as each bidder will bid its true costs.
Note, that these are also the K −X lowest cost losers in the first auction.

The above is a straightforward generalization of Weber’s Martingale Theorem.
Lemma 1 Suppose there are N suppliers, who each can sell at most one unit. Let cjt denote
j′s cost in period t = 1, 2.Suppose that the cj1’s are uniformly distibuted over [0, 1], and that
cj2 = cj1 + z + εj for each j, where each εj is an independent random draw from a (non-
degenerate) distribution with a zero mean. Suppose the auctioneer will purchases X units
in the first auction, and Y = K −X units in the second auction, where N > K.. Supppose
that the price in each auction is the highest losing offer. Also suppose that E[cK+1|c] is
an increasing function of c, where E[cK+1|c] is the expected value, as of period 1, of the
(K + 1)st lowest cost in period 2 for a bidder with cost c. Then, the expected value of the
price in the second auction is E[cY+12 |c = E(cX+11 )], and the expected value of the price in
the first auction is
E [cX+11 |c = cX+1] + E(max{0, cY+12 − c− ε− z}|c = cX+1)]
where cX+11 is the X + 1
st lowest cost in period 1, and cY+12 is the (Y + 1)
st lowest cost in
period 2.
Proof: The assumption that E[cK+1|c] is an increasing function of c means that the
K lowest cost bidders in period 1 will have the lowest K expected costs for period 2, and
the bidder with the (X + 1)st lowest cost in period 1 will have the lowest losing bid in the
first auction.
Conditional on c = cX+11 , i.e., on a bidder with costs c having the (X + 1)
st lowest cost
in period 1, this bidder will want a higher price than cX+11 in period 1, as its expected payoff
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in period 2 is E
[{
max{0, cK+1 − c− ε− z} |c = cX+1] > 0. Note, that the expected value
of the price in period 1 is E[cX+11 ] +E[max{0, E[cy+12 ]− c− ε− z|c = cX+1}] > E[cY+12 |c =
E(cX+11 )] , which is the expected price in period 2.

Notice that if bidder costs remain the same across auctions, then the first period price
is E[cK+12 |cX+11 ] as in Weber’s Martingale theorem.
The above lemma provides conditions that equilibrium prices must satisfy.
Proposition 2 Suppose the conditions of Lemma 1 are satisfied. Suppose that X +Y = K,
and E
[
cX+11
]
= E
[
cY+12
]
, so that as independent auctions, competition would be the same
in the two auctions. Then the price will be lower in the second auction.
Proof: The price in the second auction is E
[
cY+12
]
, and in the first auction, the price is
= E[cX+11 |c = cX+1] + E
{
max{0, cy+12 − c− ε− z}|c = cX+1
}
= E[cY2 ] + E
{
max{0, cy+12 − c− ε− z}|c = cX+1
}
> E[cY+12 ]

Proposition 2 does not impose any conditions other than that the two auctions, if conducted
independently, would be equally competitive. Generally, bidders’ strategic incentive to delay
sales means creates a slight bias in favor of an auction manager purchasing more in the first
auction, assuming competition is the same at both dates.17 Thus, if the auction manager
can choose how to divide the amount purchased over time, and must choose this in advance
of the first auction, the auction manager will want to purchase less in the second auction,
assuming other circumstances are otherwise the same.
17In a forward auction, the auction manager would want to sell more in the first auction.
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Proposition 3 Suppose the assumptions of Lemma 1 are satisfied and that E(z) = 0. Also,
suppose E[c
(j+1)
i ] are increasing in j, for 1 = 1, 2 and j = X,Y, and that E[c
K+1
1 ] = E[c
K+1
2 ],
then minimizing of expected costs will require some lots purchased in both auctions.
Proof: If all lots are purchased in one auction, then expected costs are K×E[cK+11 ] =
K × E[cK+12 ]. Purchasing one lot in period 1 and (K − 1) lots in period 2 reduces
expected costs in period 2 to (K − 1) × E[cK2 ] and expected costs in period 1 will be
E[c21] + E
{
max{0, E[cK |c]− c− ε− z}. The assumed monoticity of E[c(j+1)i ] implies that
per unit expected costs in both periods 1 and 2 must decrease.

Note that differentiation of equation ?? with respect to X at X = 0 and X = K can
also establish the above result. Essentially, the assumption that increasing volume in an
auction leads to a less competitive, or higher, procurement costs, not factoring in strategic
incentives of bidders to delay sales, means that there is some cost savings from splitting the
procurement across auctions. In the example in the previous section, with uniform cost,
stochastically equivalent cost distributions in each period, costs will be minimized when
somewhat more is purchased in the first period than in the second. There is also an ex
ante bias. If dividing the total amount needed to be auctioned into X in the first auction
and Y in the second would tend to minimize total expected costs absent bidder incentives
to withhold supply in the first auction, then Proposition 2 implies that on the margin, the
amount allocated in the second auction should be kept so low that expected costs in the
second are no higher than the first auction. If not, bidders will have incentives to wait. Of
course, costs can change, or information can be revealed, that offsets this affect, and would
still mean that the optimal ex ante decision could still entail more being purchased at the
later date.
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The above assumes that the auction manager set X and Y in advance. This is essentially
an “open loop” approach. A question arises as to whether the auction manager need, or
should commit, to a specific auction volume, or to retain discretion to purchase a larger
fraction than initially planned, or than would be purchased in the first auction assuming
an open loop optimal allocation. A commitment not to purchase more at a given date
than a given amount can those bidders in the first auction to bid more aggressively as the
opportunities to sell in the second auction will be limited.18 However, offsetting this are the
benefits that accrue to the auction manager from being able to adjust purchases based on
the actual level of competition in the auction. In the simple case, with only two auctions,
discretion, or a closed loop solution, will result in lower expected costs.
Proposition 4 Suppose the assumptions of Lemma 1 are satisfied. Suppose that the auction
manager can set unit specific reserve prices in the first auction. Then, the expected costs
will be minimized when the unit specific reserve prices prj for unit j in the first auction as
follows:
prj = (K − j + 1)Pj−1,k−j+1 − (K − j)Pj,K−j
where Pj,K−j is the expected price in the second auction when j units are sold in the first
auction and K − j units are sold in the second.
Proof: By construction, the terms E[c
(j+1)
i ] are increasing in j, for 1 = 1, 2 and
j = X,Y . Let X∗ +Y ∗ = K minimize ex ante expected costs in a sequence of two auctions.
Then a reserve price for the jth in the first auction equal to the difference in the expected
costs in the second auction when purchasing one more unit in that auction.

18For example, Kydland and Prescott (1977) explain the advantages of rules over discretion.
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5 Multiple Auctions
When there are three or more auctions, it is still possible to work backwards. A bidder’s
opportunity cost in one auction is not just the price it can get in the next auction. Rather,
it is its expected surplus. When bidders are very similar ex ante, so there is little benefit in
winning an early auction, but late in a sequence of auctions costs diverge, so that winners
in late auctions can expect high surplus, bidder reservation prices in early auction can be
relatively high. The converse is true when, ex ante, bidders have quite different costs, or
expectations, that tend to diverge over time. To see this I slightly modify the example of
Section 3 to allow for three auctions for one lot each. As above, it is assumed that there N
bidders to start, and each bidder can win at most one lot. I suppose that in each auction
each bidder’s cost is a uniform draw from [0, 1] in all three periods.
In this case, price will be increasing for all N > 3˙. The following table provides some
sample values, where P (t) denotes the price in the tth auction.
N 20 10 5
P(1) 0.105 0.222 0.5
P(2) 0.103 0.214 0.483
P(3) 0.101 0.205 0.446
Total Cost 0.309 0.641 1.429
However, if there is costs diverge quite a bit at the end, this trend will reverse. The
following table assumes that costs will spread out in the last period, so that expected surplus
for the last period winner is ten times larger other things equal than in the previous example.
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N 10
P(1) 0.222
P(2) 0.339
P(3) 1.305
Total Cost 1.866
The incentives illustrated by the above example are relevant when bidders do have
different abilities to perform, but may only discover these differences over time. On the
other hand, when there are common value components to costs, as well as idiosyncratic ones,
bidders will have relatively little incentive to wait, as surplus will be relatively higher in the
early auctions.
When there is a sequence of K procurement auctions, there is some tendency for prices
to rise over time. To see this consider the following simple situation in which, as above, the
auction manager purchases one lot in each of K auction19. Then,
Proposition 5 Suppose, there is a sequence of K auctions N > K bidders, and that the
auction manager will purchase one unit in each auction. Also suppose that no bidder can win
more than one auction. Suppose that in each auction, each bidder’s cost is an independent
draw from the same distribution. For N sufficiently larger than K, the expected price will
necessarily be an increasing function of the number of auctions remaining, or decreasing
from one auction to the next .
Proof:
Let cj(t) denote bidder j’s costs in auction t and ∆ = E[c
2(t)−c1(t)] where cj(t) denotes
the jth lowest (realized) cost in auction t. Let ρ denote probability that a bidder has the
19Englebrecht-Wiggans (1994) provied a result in which N is large, and (N −K) is fixed in size.
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lowest cost in the first auction, and ρ(t) this probability in auction t = 2, 3, . . . ,K. Notice
that ρ(t) is increasing in t but, for large enough N, it is arbitrarily close to ρ. Notice that
bidder j’s willingness to sell in auction t is approximately cj(t)+∆
1
ρ(1− ρ)
[
1− (1−ρ)k−t+1]
and that this is decreasing in t.

The above Proposition examines the case when the number of bidders becomes large,
but the total number of lots remains constant, or small relative to the number of bidders.
There are several other ways in there can be a large number of bidders and auctions. One
variant is that there can be a large number of auctions, but on average there is a constant
ratio of bidders to objects. This would be the case when the buyers and sellers both have
other options, and there is continuing exit and entry, or that participation is a variable.
Another is where there are a large number of lots, and so, most bidders will eventually
become winners.20
6 Other Types of Sequential Auctions
This paper provides an analysis of a few types of sequential auctions. The main insight is
that expected surplus in later auctions and not just expected price will affect prices in early
auctions. This insight applies where bidder opportunities change over time, or where there
is learing, and information aggregation within auctions. There are four other factors that
can be significant in sequential auctions, and which are not addressed in the above analysis.
First, it is assumed that the auction manager has a fixed, inelastic demand. Clearly,
this is unrealistic. In addition, the auction manager will often have a reserve price or a cap
on what it can or will pay. As noted in the introduction, a number of previous papers ahve
looked at various aspects of sequential auctions in this case.
20Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1994) analyzed this case.
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Second, bidders, at times, view products purchased or supplied in sequential auctions
as complements. For example, it has been argued that bidders in spectrum auctions in the
US and Europe faced complementarities.21 Here I very briefly sketch how complementarities
can affect bidding in sequential auctions. Here I consider two lots, and N bidders. Each
bidder has a cost of 0 for 0 lots, and a cost of 1 for one lot or two lots. I assume that the
auction manager purchases the two lots, one at a time, in consecutive second price sealed-bid
auctions. The equilibrium is easily calculated. Bidders will each offer 0 in the first auction
and 1 in the second, assuming ties in the second auction also are resolved in favor of the
low cost bidder. All bidders get zero profits, and price rises. More generally, complements
will cause prices to rise in reverse auction and fall in forward auctions. Arguably, this is
the pattern of prices in the European 3G spectrum auctions in which prices fell. Budget
constraints can also give rise to declining prices, and can face bidders in auctions.22 There
was also declining participation in the European 3G auctions - there were also fewer bidders
in the later auctions, although the some of the losers in the first few auctions did often
particpate in, and win, later auctions.
European 3G Auctions
Country Date Per Capita Revenue Number of bidders/licenses
UK March, April 2000 $4.90 13/5
Germany July, August 2000 $4.74 7/ 4 - 6
Netherlands July 2000 $2.33 6/5
Italy October 2000 $1.84 6/5
Austria November 2000 $0.62 6/4-6
Switzerland December 2000 $0.13 4/4
Third, bidders may be able to bid into different markets. A budget constrained bidder
might be able to purchase a spectrum license in the UK or Germany, but may not be able to
acquire both. An energy service provider may be able to sell electricity in Northern Californa
21See Klemperer (2004) and Milgrom (2004).
22Salant (1997) and Bulow, Levin and Milgrom (2008) have analyzed the impact of budget constraints in
spectrum auctions.
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or Southern Californa, but will have capacity constraints. This analysis has not explicitly
incorporated an additional auction. However, the results should apply to the extent that
bidder opportunity costs woudl still vary in the ways described across auctions.
Fourth, bidders may have market power. An auction manager’s decisions about how to
divide what needs to be auctioned over time may have limited effect when there are bidders
who serve a large share of the auction volume. This does mean that the auction manager’s
discretion will not affect price, just that it has less impact within a given set of constraints
about the timing of the auctions and no inability to reduce the aggregate volume auctioned.
At an extreme, if the auction manager can set low reserve prices for procurement auctions,
and high reserve prices in forward auctions, and very, very gradually adjust the reserve price
if there are no bidders, the sequence of auction will have many of the properties of a one-
sided bargaining game, and the auction manager will be able to extract much of the bidders’
surplus.
The analysis has useful implications for market design. For example, the California
energy crisis in the Summer 2000 was often blamed on the lack of long term contracts. This
analysis suggests that problem was perhaps more with the excessive reliance on real-time
contracts.23
23See Joskow (2001), and Joskow and Kahn (2001).
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